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   2 
Introduction 
 
The private sector has long linked performance to rewards. Governments seeking to drive up 
productivity in the public sector have sought to emulate this (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992). 
Performance has been linked directly to financial rewards: examples include performance 
based pay for managers and teams in the Job Training and Partnership Act of 1983 (Heckman 
et al., 1997) and performance related pay for teachers in Israel (Lavy, 2008). More commonly, 
performance of public organisations has been made explicit and organisations have been set 
targets for performance. In this case, the link to rewards is less direct than in performance 
related pay but operates through career concerns of senior managers.  
 
This interest in linking performance and reward is despite theoretical analyses which suggest 
that  the  public  sector  may  be  particularly  susceptible  to  many  of  the  pitfalls  of  formal 
incentives. The multiple objectives that many public agencies face give agents opportunities 
to divert activity away from non-incentivised tasks, so that the optimal contract may have 
very low powered incentives (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991; Baker, 1992). The inherent 
inefficiency of the public sector may mean that monitoring for proper incentives may be weak 
(Prendergast, 2003), so giving agents opportunities to game the performance targets set by 
their political masters (for example, Courty and Marschke, 1997; Bevan and Hood 2006a; 
Smith, 1995). 
 
However,  from  another  perspective,  the  use  of  high  profile  targets  accompanied  by 
monitoring of agents and publication of performance may be beneficial. High profile targets 
may act as missions around which employees may coalesce (Friedman and Kelman, 2007). 
Dewatripont et al. (1999) have stressed the importance of missions in increasing productivity 
in public sector organisations. Besley and Ghatak (2003, 2005) have shown that missions, 
through the associated matching of mission orientated firms and workers, can be a substitute 
for explicit financial rewards. The link to rewards may also decrease the amount of effort 
spent on tasks which public employees value but bring less social welfare
 (e.g. Heckman et 
al.,  1997).  So  a  target  directed  towards  performance  improvement,  where  performance  is 
widely acknowledged to be in need of enhancement, may improve the measured outcome 
without diversion of activity or gaming.  
   3 
This paper investigates this idea by examining the responses to a high profile target regime 
implemented  in  a  large  public  sector  organisation.  In  2000,  in  response  to  widespread 
dissatisfaction  with  waiting  times  for  hospital  care,  the  English  government  instituted  an 
aggressive target based policy to reduce the very long waiting lists for non-emergency care in 
the National Health Service (NHS).
1 Target maximum waiting times were set on an annual 
basis, monitored monthly and reduced each year. NHS hospitals in England were to have no 
patients waiting for inpatient treatment for more than 18 months by the end of March 2001, a 
length of time that was to decrease annually by 3 months until a maximum of six months in 
December 2005. Performance against targets was published widely and used as the basis for 
direct sanctions and rewards. Managers of poorly performing hospitals could be fired, while 
managers of high performing hospitals were granted greater autonomy in how they managed 
their hospitals and the freedom to keep certain surpluses. This policy was unprecedented in 
three ways; it was long-term, specified escalating targets, and was rigorously enforced and 
monitored. The penalties for managerial failure in meeting these targets were judged so strong 
that the regime has been dubbed one of ‘targets and terror’ and likened to the targets set for 
managers of state enterprises in pre-reform Soviet Russia (Hood and Bevan, 2005; Bevan and 
Hood, 2006b).  
 
Hospitals are multi-product organisations, so targets on waiting lists could lead to reductions 
of effort on less well monitored outputs. In addition, the performance measure – an absolute 
number of people waiting less than a certain amount of time - may have been manipulated by 
managers to give the appearance of hitting the target, whilst in reality not achieving them. 
This  raises  the  concern  -  widely  expressed  by  the  public,  political  commentators  and 
clinicians when the targets were announced (Kelman and Friedman, 2007) - that the use of a 
high powered incentive system to reduce waiting times might have ‘hit the target but missed 
the point’. 
 
This paper evaluates whether this was the case. We examine first whether the target regime 
achieved its goal of reducing the long waits for elective care. Second, we examine whether 
this was at the expense of performance on other activities which were not subject to targets. 
Third, we ask whether hospitals ‘gamed’ the targets, by categorising patients in ways that 
meant they were not counted or by reshuffling patients on the list so that patients were treated 
                                                 
1 The reduction of waiting times targets was one of the five election pledges used by the Blair campaign to win 
the 1997 general election.   4 
in terms of list priority rather than medical need. Finally, we examine the impact of the policy 
on quality of patient care.  
 
To do this we exploit the fact that the targets were a natural experiment. The policy was 
implemented in England. Pre-1999 health policy was common to all four countries of the 
United  Kingdom  (UK)  and  set  in  Westminster.  Post-1999  the  UK  government  devolved 
responsibility over various domains of public policy to each country, including responsibility 
for the health service. None of the other countries in the UK chose to implement the waiting 
list target policy. We use this difference between England and Scotland, the largest of the 
three other countries in the UK, to identify the impact of the target regime
2. We supplement 
this difference-in-difference approach with analyses at the hospital level for England to test 
that the responses to pressure from waiting times targets that we observe at country level are 
mirrored at the hospital level.  
 
We find that the targets reduced waiting times by 13 days at the mean, with considerably 
larger reductions at the top end of the distribution. Levels of non-emergency (elective) care 
rose, with no apparent reductions in non-targeted activity (emergency care and length of stay). 
We  find  no  evidence  of  re-ordering  of  patients  on  lists  to  meet  targets.  Nor  do  we  find 
evidence of a fall in patient quality: in fact, in terms of some outcomes, we find that quality of 
care  in  England  rose  post  policy.  We  do,  however,  find  some  evidence  of  waiting  list 
manipulation: patients were removed, temporarily and permanently, from waiting lists. On the 
basis of the quality measures we examine, we conclude that these suspensions and removals 
were not harmful to patient health. 
 
 
1.  Institutional background and possible responses to targets 
 
1.1  The institutional background 
 
Health care in the UK  is predominantly provided by the National Health Service (NHS), 
which is funded by general taxation, free to the consumer at the point of use and employs 
                                                 
2 We select Scotland, rather than Northern Ireland or Wales, as the appropriate comparator to England. It is the 
largest of the three devolved administrations and has a greater degree of devolution and independence of its 
Parliament. It also has a more self-contained healthcare system with less cross-border flows between England 
and Scotland as compared to between England and Wales.   5 
around  1.2  million  people.
3  In  the  NHS,  purchasing  organisations  receive  budgets  from 
central government to procure care for geographically-defined populations. In the period we 
examine, these purchasers negotiated contracts with local groupings of hospitals, known as 
NHS Trusts (referred to as hospitals in the rest of this paper). Three-quarters of contracts 
between purchasers and these providers were ‘block’ contracts, in which payment was only 
linked to volume in cases of extreme under- or over-performance (Goddard et al., 1997). For 
most  purchasers  there  was  a  high  degree  of  concentration  of  business  with  their  local 
suppliers.  On  average,  the  main  local  provider  accounted  for  nearly  70  percent  of  a 
purchaser’s  admissions  in  the  financial  year  2002  (Dusheiko  et  al.,  2008).  Competition 
between hospitals was not encouraged in the period studied here.  
 
For emergency care, patients have direct access to specialist treatment. For all other hospital 
care (known as elective care), which accounts for around half of all care, they must first 
contact their family doctor (GP). The GP provides a referral to a specialist employed in an 
NHS hospital. The individual waits for this first specialist appointment and, if more intensive 
treatment is required, then waits again for admission to hospital. The long periods for which 
patients had to wait for treatment were a very sensitive political issue, particularly the waiting 
times between seeing a specialist and admission to hospital, known as the inpatient waiting 
time. The targets to reduce these waiting times is our focus here. 
 
Prior to devolution in 1999 inpatient waiting time targets were set by the Patients’ Charter 
(Department of Health, 1995). The Charter was common to England and Scotland and set a 
maximum waiting time of 18 months for 1997 and 1998 for England and 12 months for 
Scotland. It was not backed up by strong managerial sanctions. In 1999, the UK government 
devolved  responsibility  for  the  health  service,  creating  new  administrations  with 
responsibility for policy and provision of NHS care in Scotland, Wales and (for some time) 
Northern Ireland.  
 
Post this devolution the Department of Health in England in 2000 announced an ambitious 
‘modernisation and reform’ programme (Department of Health, 2000). The ‘target and terror’ 
regime for the time spent waiting for inpatient treatment that is outlined above was a key 
                                                 
3 There is a limited private sector which specialises in treatments for which there are long waiting lists. Demand 
in this sector has been shown to be a function of NHS waiting lists (Besley et al., 1999). Over the period 
analysed here demand for private care remained relatively static (Laing, 2007).    6 
plank of these reforms. The Scottish Executive chose not to adopt this regime. Instead, from 
devolution  in  1999,  it  focused  on  the  abolition  of  the  1990s  ‘quasi-market’  and  the  re-
introduction of a professionally-led, integrated system based on concepts such as managed 
clinical  networks  (Alvarez-Rosete  et  al.,  2005).  Targets  played  little  role.  The  overall 
guarantees  of  12  months  remained,  though  there  were  (new)  exceptions  for  certain 
(undefined) conditions of ‘low clinical priority.’ In 2000 the Scottish Executive set down an 
“expectation” that waiting times should not exceed 9 months by the end of December 2003 
(Scottish Executive, 2000) but waiting times at hospital level were not made public and this 
expectation was not strongly monitored. There were some signs that the policy in Scotland 
changed in 2003 when the White Paper issued in February 2003 (Scottish Executive, 2003) 
offered  patients  “a  guarantee  that  our  national  targets  will  be  met…[and]  monitored”.  In 
November 2003 the Scottish Executive refined its objectives to “12 National Priorities”, one 
of which was reducing waiting times. However, this greater focus was still not accompanied 
by publication of performance at hospital level or the coupling of performance against targets 
and managerial sanctions that operated in England.  
 
Table 1 summarises the differences in the maximum waiting times set for hospitals in each 
year.
4 The level in England was higher initially. The announcement in 2000 - which covered 
the time period up to 2005 - was to drive the maximum waiting time steadily downwards in 
England through a set of ever-stricter targets. The Scottish administration maintained their 
target of 12 months until 2003/4 and only then lowered it. The net effect was that by 2004/5 
the target in England was below that allowed in Scotland despite being 6 months higher in 
2000.  
 
Table 1. Target maximum waiting times (months) in England and Scotland 
   97/98  98/09  99/00  00/01  01/02  02/03  03/04  04/05 
England  18  18  18  18  15  12  9  6 
Scotland  12  12  12  12  12  12  9  9 
Source: Propper et al. (2008b). All targets were enforced from the end of the fiscal year (March), with the 
exception of the 6 months target, which applied from Dec 2005. 
 
 
                                                 
4 Purchasers were also assessed on whether the waiting times of their residents at local hospitals complied with 
the target but had little influence over this performance.    7 
1.2  The impact of targets on managerial behaviour in English hospitals 
 
Targets were set on the stock of patients on the elective admission list. A hospital manager 
facing the target could take three types of action. She could increase effort to reduce the 
number who would wait longer than the prescribed length of time (the monitored task) and 
could divert effort away from non-monitored tasks. But on top of this, as the performance 
measure is a target, the manager could ‘game’ the target by taking actions which make it seem 
that the target has been met when in fact it has not.
5  
 
Effort  on  the  monitored  task:  We  assess  the  extent  of  effort  on  the  monitored  task  by 
examining the waiting times of treated patients. This was the object of the policy. However, in 
order to check that managers did this without reducing the number of people treated, we also 




Diversion  of  effort  from  non-monitored  tasks:  We  assess  the  extent  of  possible  effort 
diversion from non-monitored tasks by looking at the volume of emergency patients and the 
length  of  stay  of  elective  patients.  Effort  could  be  diverted  away  from  the  treatment  of 
emergency  patients,  though  as  hospitals  have  little  control  over  the  inflow  of  patients 
attending emergency departments we might expect relatively little reduction in the volumes of 
such patients. Less effort spent on elective patients who were admitted is more likely. For 
example, hospitals could reduce bed utilisation by increasing the proportion of patients treated 
with no overnight stay (day cases) and by decreasing lengths of stay. This would leave more 
beds available to treat those patients still on the waiting list, thereby achieving lower waiting 
times.  
 
We examine two aspects of ‘gaming’: re-classification and re-prioritisation. Re-classification 
occurred  if  patients  waiting  for  elective  care  were  reclassified  in  a  way  that  meant  their 
waiting time was not counted. Re-prioritisation occurred if patients on the waiting lists were 
                                                 
5 Gaming is a term widely used in the literature on responses to targets (Propper and Wilson, 2003). Here we use 
it to refer to actions which are designed to give the appearance of meeting the target whilst in practice not doing 
so or doing so at a cost to some of those on the list. 
6 There is little that hospitals can do to reduce the demand for referrals from GPs to see their specialists but they 
have  control  over  the  proportion  of  these  added  to  the  waiting  list  for  hospital  admission.  Since  the  same 
specialists assess patients referred by GPs in outpatient clinics and treat patients during admission events, there 
may be strong substitution between them.    8 
reshuffled so that those most likely to breach the target were treated first. Both were alleged 
to have occurred widely.
7 
 
Reclassification: There were in fact two lists for elective patients post-referral by a specialist. 
The first was the ‘active list’ of patients who were deemed to be ready for surgery. The 
second  was  the  inpatient  ‘deferred  list’  for  patients  who  needed  treatment  but  who,  for 
personal  or  medical  reasons,  were  not  yet  in  a  position  to  have  it.  This  designation  was 
decided by hospital managers and clinicians. Only the ‘active list’ was subject to targets and 
this gave opportunities for reclassification. Three categories of elective patients were not part 
of the ‘active list’: planned admissions, suspensions and removals. Planned admissions are 
those which are scheduled according to clinical factors (e.g. a course of chemotherapy or the 
second of two hip replacements). These admissions were not covered by the waiting time 
targets. Suspended patients are those patients who were deemed either not to be medically 
ready for treatment or could not attend when first given an appointment date. They were put 
onto the ‘deferred list’ and not counted towards the target. Subsequently, when they were 
returned  to  the  ‘active  list’  their  waiting  times  were  calculated  excluding  the  time  spent 
suspended. Patients could also be removed from the list (for example, if they were on the list 
and  then  subsequently  died,  or  were  treated  in  the  community  or  in  another  hospital). 
Removals were not counted in waiting list statistics.  
 
Each  of  these  three  patient  categories  offered  managers  ways  to  manipulate  performance 
against  the  targets.  The  categorisation  of  patients  as  planned  is  less  likely  to  be  used  by 
managers in response to current pressure, as patients were classified as planned at the point 
when they were added to the list. Such re-categorisation would only reduce future pressure 
and would have little impact on current pressure from targets. On the other hand, patients 
could be suspended whilst they were on the ‘active’ list by transferring them to the ‘deferred 
list’ and patients who were removed were simply taken off the ‘active’ list. Therefore both 
suspensions and removals could be used to reduce the probability that the hospital would 
breach its target in the current quarter.  
 
                                                 
7 For example, in the court case of Henry versus the British Broadcasting Corporation it was alleged that the 
following actions took place at the instigation of senior managers: removal of patients at or near the 18-month 
target from the inpatient list onto the deferred list: deliberately not admitting patients so they would not show on 
the inpatient list at the end of the month (the census date) and giving priority to long wait ‘routine’ patients over 
patient classified as ‘soon’ to ensure that long waiters would be admitted sooner (EWHC 2787 (QB), 2006).   9 
Re-prioritisation: The targets gave strong incentives to reshuffle patients on the waiting list to 
treat those who were most likely to breach the target.
8 While NHS policy stressed that the 
order in which patients on lists should be treated should be determined by clinical priority 
only, there was a  widespread belief amongst clinicians that waiting lists altered priorities 
away from those most in need to those with less urgent need for care (National Audit Office, 
2001). We examine whether waiting lists were re-prioritised by analysing the proportion of 
patients admitted within 14 days for types of treatments that were admitted urgently prior to 
the introduction of the targets. We also examine whether more patient were admitted with 
complications under the target regime. If patients who needed medical care were being denied 
treatment in favour of less medically needy cases, the knock-on effect might be that when 
those patients were finally admitted they were in a worse state of health.  
 
Outcomes: Ultimately what matters is whether any apparent effort diversion or gaming results 
in lower quality of care. We therefore assess whether these actions affected the quality of 
patient care. We do this by examining the impact of the policy on a set of measures of patient 
mortality. These outcome measures were chosen because mortality rates are often used to 
assess hospital quality, both by the regulatory agencies including UK government and in the 
research literature (e.g. Gaynor, 2006; Kessler and McClellan, 2000; Propper et al., 2008a). 
 
 
2.   Methodology and Data 
 
2.1  Difference-in-difference methodology 
 
Our primary identification strategy is to exploit the natural experiment. We use a difference-
in-difference methodology at the country level and estimate:  
 
(1)  [ ] [ ] jt j j jt jt t pr t pr o t E I I E x a f b g d q e Î Î ¢ = + + + + + +   
 
where  jt o  is the outcome of interest for country  j = Scotland or England at time  t;  1 j E =  
denotes England;  [ ] 1 t pr I Î =  if the period t is during the policy regime (2000/1 onwards) and 
                                                 
8 Where targets were fixed over time one response is to ‘stack up’ patients just below the target waiting time. In 
the environment we study, where targets were monitored monthly and reduced every year, stacking up patients 
just below the current year’s target is less helpful, particularly towards the end of the financial year as patients 
who wait just less than the current target will breach the target that will operate when the financial year changes.   10 
[ ] 0 t pr I Î =  otherwise; and  jt x  is a set of other time varying covariates which may affect the 
outcomes. We examine the period from 1
st April 1997 to 31
st March 2004 and exclude 1999 
because it was the year of transition. This includes a pre-policy period (pre-2000) and ends 
when Scotland begins to implement a waiting times target regime. The data are quarterly. The 
coefficient of interest is d .  
  
The outcomes we analyse are various summary statistics of the distribution of the waiting 
times of patients on the waiting list for elective care; elective admissions; additions to the 
elective waiting list, length of stay; emergency care admissions; planned admissions; whether 
patients were re-prioritised; whether patients had complications; and three measures of patient 
outcomes.  
  
The assumptions required for the difference-in-difference analysis to identify the impact of 
the policy are that the two countries were subject to the same policies pre-devolution and that 
the  policy  change  must  be  exogenous  to  waiting  times.  Pre-1999  health  care  policy  was 
common to both countries. The policy break in 1999 was the result of devolution, which was 
not related to waiting times for elective care in NHS hospitals. We omit 1999/00 to avoid 
contaminating  pre-policy  years  with  the  possible  effects  of  devolution.  While  the  lack  of 
focus on waiting times in Scotland post-devolution may have been due to the perception that 
waiting times were less important in Scotland than in England, Propper et al. (2008b) show 
that trends in waiting times were statistically the same in the two countries pre-policy. In our 
analyses here we test this assumption by fitting a full set of year-country interactions.  
 
2.2  Hospital level analysis 
 
As  a  robustness  check  that  the  difference-in-difference  estimates  can  be  attributed  to  the 
operation  of  targets  and  not  some  other  aspect  of  devolution  or  unrelated  changes,  we 
examine the responses of hospitals to target pressure. This variation, which is only observed 
for English hospitals, allows us to test whether any differences between the performance of 
Scottish and English hospitals at country level are mirrored in differences in performance 
between English hospitals as a response to differential target pressure.  
 
We define our measure of target pressure as the number of patients waiting in hospital h at the 
end of the previous quarter whose waiting times will exceed the end of the quarter target   11 
unless they are treated within the quarter.
9 This is normalised by the total number of patients 
waiting at the end of the previous quarter. We refer to this as the ‘distance from target’. 
 
This  measure  was  initially  plausibly  exogenous  to  the  hospital.  When  the  target  was 
introduced, the same target was set for all hospitals, thus for some hospitals this meant that 
targets were easy to achieve while for others the distance to target, and so the pressure on 
managers,  was  greater.  Further  exogenous  variation  comes  from  the  fact  that  the  targets 
changed each year. However, behaviour by a manager in response to the target will affect the 
tightness of the target. For example, if patients with longer waits are treated first in order to 
meet the target, this will initially reduce the target pressure. But if this treatment is at the 
expense of treating other patients, this increase in the stock will increase the pressure in the 
future.  In general, responses to target pressure may be quite complex, as the manager can 
substitute between different activities and also try to influence the inflow of patients. We 
therefore estimate a reduced form model that allows for dynamics in the outcome measures 
and for possible measurement error and/or endogeneity. 
 
We estimate various specifications of the general model: 
  
(2)  , 1 , ht h t ht i h t i h ht i o d z o v a b q g h - - ¢ = + + + + + ∑ , 
 
where  ht o  is the outcome measure for hospital  h, at time t;  , 1 h t d -  is the distance from target 
for hospital h at the end of the previous quarter,  1 t - ;  ht z  contains controls for the size of the 
hospital workforce and a full set of time dummies; and the  h h  are unobserved hospital effects 
that are constant over time. The parameter of interest is  b , the response in the outcome 
measure to an increase in target pressure. In the estimation, we weight by list size and report 
robust standard errors that are clustered at hospital level. The time period is 1
st April 2001 to 
31
st March 2006, which begins from the introduction of the first target and finishes when the 
6 months target takes effect.  
 
We estimate equation (2) with both a fixed effects, or within-groups, estimator and using the 
Arellano-Bond (1991) instrumental variables estimator for dynamic panel data models. This 
                                                 
9 For example, the number of patients waiting more than 15 months on the 31
st December 2000 (the 18 month 
target maximum first takes effect on the 31
st March 2001).   12 
estimation procedure transforms the model into first differences and uses lagged levels of the 
outcome  measures  to  instrument  the  endogenous  lagged  differences.  We  further  treat  the 
hospital workforce variable as endogenous due to measurement error, and the distance from 
target measure  , 1 h t d -  as pre-determined, meaning that  , 1 h t d -  may be correlated with  , 1 h t v - . In 
the model for admissions,  , 2 h t d -  was found to be correlated with the error in the differenced 
model and we adjusted the instrument set accordingly. The Generalised Method of Moments 
(GMM) estimation technique is used to obtain parameter estimates. See the Appendix B for 
further details. 
 
We use this approach to analyse three possible responses to target pressure. First, we examine 
admissions. Second, we examine gaming of the waiting list by exploiting data on removals 
and suspensions that are available for English hospitals only and we examine the proportion 
of patients added to the waiting list as a planned admission. Third, we examine the impact on 
patient outcomes. 
 
2.3  Data 
 
The data are from a number of sources, precise details of which are given in Appendix A. A 
brief overview follows below. 
 
Episode data 
Episode  data  contain  information  about  inpatient  and  day-case  (ambulatory  surgical 
treatment) episodes in the NHS. A record is generated at the end of each episode, when a 
patient is discharged from care or transferred to the care of another consultant or provider. For 
periods of care comprising more than one episode (due to transfers), we refer to the first in the 
sequence  as  the  admission  record.  Our  analysis  uses  elective,  planned
10  and  emergency 
admission records from the Hospital Episode Statistics (HES) database for England and the 
Scottish Morbidity Record (SMR01) for Scotland. The total annual numbers of these are large 
(6.4M electives + planned and 4.1M emergencies for England, 0.6M electives + planned and 
0.5M emergencies for Scotland in 2003/04). We use random samples of elective and planned 
admissions (10% for England, 50% for Scotland) and all the data on emergency admissions. 
 
                                                 
10 In our analysis we define elective admissions to exclude planned care.    13 
Waiting times for elective admissions are recorded in HES and SMR01 as the difference 
between the date of decision to admit and the date of admission. We use these to analyse 
country level waiting times distributions. 
 
We also use the data to calculate total elective admissions, additions to the elective waiting 
list, and emergency admissions; mean length of stay; planned admissions as a proportion of 
elective  and  planned  admissions  combined;  proportion  of  patients  awaiting  an  ‘urgent’ 
elective  treatment  who  are  admitted  quickly  (within  14  days)
11;  proportion  of  elective 
admissions with complications
12; and mortality within 30 days of admission for all patients, 
emergencies, and AMI emergencies aged 55 and over. All of these are calculated at country 
level for use in our difference-in-difference analysis. Planned admissions are also calculated 
and analysed at hospital level.  
 
Census data 
Hospital  level  waiting  list  data  for  England  are  collected  on  a  quarterly  basis  by  the 
Department of Health and contain information about the stock of patients waiting on a census 
date (the last day of the month in June, September, December and March) and the flows on 
and  off  the  list  during  the  quarter.  The  data  are  published  at  provider  level  and  used  to 
monitor performance against NHS waiting time targets. 
 
The data include a breakdown – in three-monthly time bands – of the waits so far experienced 
by the patients on the waiting list at the census date. We use this to construct the measure of 
hospital level target pressure as defined in the methodology section above. 
 
The census data also include counts of elective admissions, suspensions and removals during 
the quarter, which we use in our hospital level analysis. It is not possible to identify which 
patients are suspended or removed. Since data for Scotland are not collected on an equivalent 
basis, we are unable to analyse removals and suspensions using our difference-in-difference 
methodology. 
 
                                                 
11 In order to define urgent treatment we calculated, for each Healthcare Resource Group (HRG), the proportion 
of patients admitted within 14 days during the pre-policy period. HRGs for which this proportion exceeded 80 
per cent were classified as urgent. 
12 The presence of complications is identified via HRG codes, for those HRGs which differentiate between with 
and without complications.    14 
A hospital is included in our sample for analysis if it has a waiting list of at least 150. At the 
end of 2005/06 there were 216 hospitals of which 184 met this criterion. 
 
Other data sources 
Data  on  patient  mortality  are  constructed  by  matching  HES  to  ONS  death  records.  Our 
analysis uses the following four outcome measures for the specialties General Surgery and 
Trauma  and  Orthopaedics:  in-hospital  mortality,  mortality  before  or  within  28  days  of 
discharge, and mortality within 30 days of selected surgical procedures (elective and non-
elective separately). We also look at mortality before or within 28 days of discharge following 
an AMI and mortality within 30 days of a CABG operation.  
 
In robustness tests of the difference-in-difference analyses we control for health expenditure 
and  need.  These  data  are  taken  from  the  Public  Expenditure  Statistical  Analyses  (health 
expenditure)  and  ONS  Population  Trends  (population  estimates  and  age  standardised 
mortality  ratios).  Our  hospital  level  analyses  use  data  on  the  workforce  and  finances  of 




3.  Did the targets reduce waiting times?  
 
We begin our analysis with an examination of whether the targets did reduce waiting times. 
Propper et al. (2008b) showed that the policy reduced the proportion of the persons on the list 
waiting longer than the targets. Here we examine the whole distribution of waiting times. 
Figure  1  presents  the  distribution  of  realised  waiting  times  for  all  patients  who  received 
elective treatment in the two countries. Patients were classified according to the year in which 
they were put on the list. The dotted line shows the pre-policy distribution (the same in each 
(country-specific) panel). The solid line shows the post-policy distribution, where there is one 
for each year for each country. The vertical dotted lines mark the waiting times targets in 
operation in England. Comparing pre- and post-policy distributions, it is clear that the effect 
of the policy in England was to pull the distribution leftwards at the right tail. In contrast in   15 
Scotland  the  distribution  moved  rightwards,  increasing  the  number  of  longer  waits  and 
reducing the number that waited below the target set for England.
13  
 
Table  2  presents  formal  statistical  tests  of  the  impact  of  the  target  using  difference-in-
difference estimates of the impact of the policy on various points in the distribution. At the 
bottom end of the distribution (the 10
th and the 25
th percentile) the policy appears to have 
resulted in English waits that are slightly higher. At higher points of the distribution, waits 
after the policy in England fell significantly. The falls in waiting time are 13 days at the mean 
and 55 days at the 90
th percentile. The results at the mean, the 75
th and the 90
th percentile are 
robust to a measure of need, health care expenditure and staffing at the country level.
14  
 
The  model  was  re-estimated  with  a  full  set  of  time  dummies  to  test  the  common  trends 
assumption (which is also a test of no anticipation effects). The results (Table A3 in the 
Appendix)  indicate  no  significant  reduction  in  the  proportion  waiting  prior  to  the  policy 
introduction except at the very top of the distribution where there is a reduction at the 90
th 
percentile in the two  years immediately before the policy in England and one at the 75
th 
percentile in 1999. However, these falls are much smaller than those in any of the post policy 
years and probably reflect responses to the general concern over very long waits that existed 
prior to the introduction of the target regime. Falls at other parts of the distribution only 
started in the first year of the policy.  
 
These analyses indicate that the policy appears to have had the intended effect on waiting 
times  in  England.  These  fell  not  just  to  meet  the  targets,  but  across  the  top  half  of  the 
distribution.  
 
                                                 
13 Similar trends have been observed for Wales and Northern Ireland (Alvarez-Rosete et al., 2005), suggesting 
that this is the trend that would have been observed in England in the absence of the regime. Besley et al. (2008) 
use a difference-in-difference analysis for England and Wales and also find that targets reduced waiting times. 
14 Introducing these controls slightly increases the d-in-d estimates: the fall in mean waiting time is -16 (se=2.8), 
the 75
th percentile is -21 (se=4.8) and the 90
th percentile is -74 (se =13.3) days, respectively.   16 
Figure 1. Distribution of waiting times 
 
Notes: horizontal-axis on the log scale. English data from HES (10% sample of elective spells by financial year 
of addition to list, 1997/98 to 2003/04). Scottish data from SMR01 (50% sample of elective spells by financial 
year  of  addition  to  list,  1997/98  to  2003/04).  Vertical  line  is  positioned  at  the  English  end-of-year  target 
maximum wait. 
 

















  (0.19)  (0.26)  (0.69)  (2.53)  (6.62)  (1.39) 
Year  0.06  0.14  1.30
**  3.61
**  -3.45  -0.95 
  (0.08)  (0.11)  (0.29)  (1.05)  (2.76)  (0.58) 
England  -1.00





  (0.26)  (0.36)  (0.95)  (3.50)  (9.15)  (1.93) 
Policy  -0.66  -0.61  -2.24  0.42  48.19
**  12.01
** 
  (0.38)  (0.53)  (1.41)  (5.19)  (13.59)  (2.86) 
Policy*England  0.94
**  1.13




   (0.31)  (0.44)  (1.16)  (4.28)  (11.21)  (2.36) 
Number of obs  48  48  48  48  48  48 
Notes: English data from HES (10% sample of elective spells by quarter of addition to list, 1997/98 to 2003/04). 
Scottish data from SMR01 (50% sample of elective spells by quarter of addition to list, 1997/98 to 2003/04). 
Pre-policy  period  is  1997/98  to  1998/99;  post-policy  period  is  2000/01  to  2003/04.  1999/00  omitted. 
Observations are at quarterly country level. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: * 5% ** 1%   17 
4.   Reallocation of activity, gaming and patient outcomes 
 
4.1  Effort on monitored and unmonitored tasks 
 
Waiting times fell as a result of the policy. To achieve this, hospitals may have diverted effort 
towards getting elective patients treated, but simultaneously added fewer patients onto the 
elective waiting list and so avoided the necessity of increasing effort in the future. They could 
have also reduced effort on the treatment of elective patients by discharging them sooner or 
reduced effort on non-elective patients.  
 
We begin by examining whether hospitals increased the number of electives treated. The top 
row of Figure 2 presents the country level trends in hospital activity for the financial years 
1997 to 2003. In both countries, elective admissions and additions to the list appear to be 
increasing before the policy. After the policy, both fell in Scotland, whilst in England the 
trends level out, with admissions and additions both increasing towards the end of the period. 
 
Figure 2. Country level activity, 1997/98 to 2003/04  
 
Notes: English data from HES, 1997/98 to 2003/04. Scottish data from SMR01, 1997/98 to 2003/04. Excepting 
the figure for length of stay, the vertical-axis for Scotland is on the right hand side. Vertical lines (from left to 
right) mark the last quarter of the pre-policy period and the first quarter of the post-policy period.   18 
Table 3 presents the difference-in-difference estimates. The first two columns show the policy 
resulted in an 11% increase in elective admissions and an 8% increase in additions to the 
waiting  lists.  Activity  in  elective  care  therefore  increased  in  response  to  targets:  English 
hospitals both admitted more patients and treated them faster.  
 
We next examine diversion of activity: did hospitals achieve a greater volume of elective care 
by reducing effort on the treatment of patients once in hospital or by reducing the number of 
non-electives patients they treated? As a measure of the first we examine lengths of stay for 
elective patients; as a measure of the second, we examine number of emergency admissions. 
Figure 2 shows little support for a reduction in effort on these two activities. The number of 
emergency admissions increases steadily in both countries. The mean length of stay decreased 
in both countries before 1999/00, after which it appears fairly level. Columns 3 and 4 of Table 
3 test for country differences. This confirms the graphical picture: there is no impact of the 
policy on either length of stay or emergency admissions.  
 
4.2    Did managers respond by gaming waiting lists? 
 
Reclassification 
As noted above, patients whose treatment was classified as planned did not count towards 
waiting  times  targets.  The  list  subject  to  target  could  also  be  reduced  by  suspending  or 
removing patients. The use of suspensions and removals cannot be examined in a difference-
in-difference framework because these data were not collected in a comparable fashion in 
England and Scotland but it is possible to examine differences pre- and post-policy in the 
volume of patients classified as planned.  
 
The  first  panel  in  Figure  3  shows  that  the  volume  of  planned  activity  rose  in  England 
compared to Scotland. The difference-in-difference estimates, in column 5 of Table 3, show 
that there is a significant increase in planned  activity in England post-policy.
15 However, 
examination of the figure shows that the initial rise in planned in England actually occurs pre-
policy and so appears to be a continuation of a change that first occurred before the policy 
rather than a response to target pressure. 
 
                                                 
15 Note the difference-in-difference estimates omit the first year of this rise, 1999, because it is a transition year.   19 




Notes: English data from HES (10% sample of elective spells by quarter of admission, 1997/98 to 2003/04). 
Scottish data from SMR01 (50% sample of elective spells by quarter of admission, 1997/98 to 2003/04). Vertical 





If managers responded to pressure by changing the ordering of treatment of patients, replacing 
treatment by medical severity with treatment by length of time on the lists, patients who pre-
policy  waited  shorter  times  would  wait  longer  post  policy.  The  difference-in-difference 
estimates  for  waiting  time  do  show  an  increase  in  waiting  times  at  the  lower  end  of  the 
waiting time distribution. To examine this further we look at whether urgent cases had longer 
waits post-policy and whether more patients were admitted with complications post-policy, 
the latter possibly indicating that sicker patients had to wait longer and so developed more 
complications whilst waiting. 
 
The second panel of Figure 3 shows the proportion of urgent cases (as defined in the data 
section)  admitted  within  two  weeks  in  the  two  countries.  It  is  clear  from  the  figure  that 
Scotland admitted a lower proportion of these cases within a fortnight. It is also clear that the 
countries diverge, with the number in England trending downwards over the period while the 
Scottish  proportions  fall  and  then  rise.  A  simple  difference-in-difference  estimator  would 
show that there is a fall in England relative to Scotland of around 2 percent. However, the 
figure also shows the two countries diverge before devolution. Estimation of a difference-in-
difference model allowing for full country-year interactions shows the common trend pre-
policy assumption is not supported by the data (results from authors), so using our country    20 
Table 3. Difference-in-difference estimates 







































  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.03)  (0.21)  (15.68)  (0.05)  (0.26)  (0.10) 




**  0.06  -0.01  -0.54
**  -0.04 










  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.04)  (0.29)  (0.46)  (0.07)  (0.36)  (0.14) 
Policy in operation  -0.09
**  -0.07
*  -0.01  -0.08  0.73  0.92
**  -0.05  0.47  -0.22 
  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.06)  (0.43)  (0.33)  (0.10)  (0.54)  (0.21) 
Policy*England  0.11
**  0.07




**  -0.27 
   (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.05)  (0.35)  (0.20)  (0.08)  (0.44)  (0.17) 
Number of obs  48  48  48  48  48  48  48  48  48 
Notes: English data from HES (10% sample of elective spells, 1997/98 to 2003/04; all emergency admissions, 1997/98 to 2003/04). Scottish data from SMR01 (50% sample 
of elective spells, 1997/98 to 2003/04; all emergency admissions, 1997/98 to 2003/04). Pre-policy period is 1997/98 to 1998/99; post-policy period is 2000/01 to 2003/04. 
1999/00 omitted. Observations are at quarterly country level. All variables except for 30 day mortality rate post admission for emergency AMI pertain to the whole hospital. 
For analysis of complications we include case-mix controls (age breakdown of admitted patients in bands (0-15, 16-24, 25-34, 35-49, 50-69, >=70)). Standard errors in 
parentheses. Significance levels: * 5% ** 1%. 
   21 
difference-in-difference design we cannot conclude that the policy increased length of waits 
for very urgent cases.  
 
To look further at reshuffling, we examine the complication rate. Figure 3 shows a large fall 
in  complications  in  England  pre-policy  but  a  very  similar  pattern  post  policy  in  the  two 
countries. Column (6) of Table 3 presents the difference-in-difference estimate. As expected 
from  the  figure  the  estimate  is  negative,  indicating  fewer  complications  in  England  post-
policy. But the difference is not significant and appears to be driven by pre- rather than post-
policy divergence in trends. 
 
4.3 The effect of the policy on quality 
 
We examine three measures of mortality as a proxy for quality: the within 30 day mortality 
rate  for  all  admissions,  all  emergency  admissions  and  emergency  admissions  for  acute 
myocardial infarction (AMI). Figure 4 shows the time trends in the two countries by quarter. 
While all the mortality series show strong seasonal effects, the trends in England appears to 
be decreasing faster, most visibly for mortality for all admissions. Thus England appears to 
have better, and not worse, outcomes post- policy. The difference-in-difference estimates in 
columns (7)-(9) of Table 3 confirm this. Post-policy the within 30-day death rate was 0.33 
percentage points lower in England and the AMI death rate was 2.1 percentage points lower. 
These are quite large falls relative to the respective means of 1.7 and 15.8. There was no 
significant change in the death rate post emergency admission.  
 
5.   Hospital level analyses 
 
The country level analyses show that the policy decreased waiting times without clear 
evidence of diversion of effort from other activities or a fall in patient outcomes. It is possible 
that these results are not due to pressure from the waiting times targets per se but derive from 
some other aspect of the policy regime in England.
16 One possibility is that it was simply the 
greater focus on the behaviour of the individual hospital in England compared to Scotland. If 
this is correct, then we would expect no relationship between the pressure that the hospital 
was under from the waiting time target and the behaviour of the hospital. We therefore use the  
                                                 
16 One candidate we have already examined, and found not to be driving the results, was the growth of health 
care resources at country level.    22 
Figure 4. Percentage dying within 30 days of treatment by country, quarterly  
 
Notes: English data from HES (10% sample of elective spells by quarter of admission, 1997/98 to 2003/04, all 
emergency spells by quarter of admission, 1997/98 to 2003/04). Scottish data from SMR01 (50% sample of 
elective  spells  by  quarter  of  admission,  1997/98  to  2003/04,  all  emergency  spells  by  quarter  of  admission, 
1997/98 to 2003/04). Vertical lines (from left to right) mark the last quarter of the pre-policy period and the first 
quarter of the post-policy period. 
 
 
between and within hospital variation in distance from targets in English hospitals to directly 
examine the association between the probability that a hospital will breach its target at the end 
of the current quarter and outcomes of interest. We examine admissions and then look more 
closely at gaming, examining first the unexpected result for planned admissions and then 
looking at removals and suspensions. Finally, we examine various mortality measures.  
 
5.1  Pressure from the targets 
 
Figure  5  shows  the  distribution  of  the  pressure  measure  across  hospitals.  It  is  clear  that  
targets got tighter each year. At the beginning of 2001, the mean proportion of patients at risk 
of breaching the target was very small for all hospitals, reflecting the fact that there were few 
individuals  who  actually  waited  over  18  months.  However,  by  the  end  of  the  period  we 
analyse, when the targets had tightened to 6 months, the mean proportion was over 20%. 
There are sharp rises at the end of each financial year followed by falls within the year. While 
we would expect an increase in the proportion of patients at risk of breaching the target as the 
targets tightened each year, the sharp rise at the end of each year indicates that hospitals did 
not change activity sufficiently in advance of a change in targets to keep the proportion of 
patients at risk constant. There is also substantial variation between hospitals in the pressure 
that  they  faced.  Over  10%  of  hospitals  faced  no  pressure  throughout  the  period  with  the 
exception of the final year and the fourth quarters when the targets tightened. In contrast, by   23 
the  end  of  the  period  10%  of  hospitals  found  themselves  with  two  in every  five  waiting 
patients threatening to breach the target if not admitted within the next quarter. 
  
Figure 5. Distribution of the pressure measure across hospitals   
 
Notes: England only; data from Department of Health waiting times/list statistics, quarter 4 of 2000/01 to quarter 
4 of 2005/06. 
 
 
5.2  Admissions 
 
We use equation (2) to test whether the increase in elective admissions seen in the country 
level analysis is associated with distance from target. Table 4 presents the results. We show 
first the static fixed effects, or within groups (hospital) estimates (column 1) and test whether 
this model is misspecified in terms of dynamics by examining the serial correlation in the 
residuals. We then allow for dynamics using the within groups estimator (column 2), where 
the number of lags of the dependent variable is determined by the tests for serial correlation. 
We then present our preferred Arellano-Bond GMM estimates, which allow for dynamics and 
endogeneity, in column 3.  
 
Column  1  shows  clear  evidence  of  serial  correlation  in  the  residuals  when  dynamics  are 
omitted.  Column  2  allows  for  lagged  and  twice-lagged  admissions.  With  both  lags  the 
hypothesis of no serial correlation in the residuals cannot be rejected. The estimate on the 
pressure  variable  is  significant.  The  coefficient  estimate  shows  a  1  point  increase  in  the 
pressure variable (which runs from 0 to 100) leads to a 0.2% increase in elective admissions. 
The GMM estimates pass the specification tests. The dynamics are similar to the fixed effects   24 
estimates of column (2), but the estimates of the effect of distance from target are somewhat 
larger for the GMM estimates. A 1 percentage point increase in target pressure results in just 
under a 1% increase in admissions. 
 
Table 4. Estimated effect of target pressure on admissions and planned additions 
  Admissions  Planned Additions 








































             
AR1 (p)  0.00  0.14  0.00  0.00  0.36  0.00 
AR2 (p)  0.00  0.16  0.43  0.00  0.42  0.39 
Hansen (p)      0.19      0.52 
Dof      5      5 
N  217  213  189  148  148  147 
NT  3572  3184  2967  2594  2288  2138 
Notes: Dependent variables are log admissions and log planned additions. Estimation routine used is xtabond2 in 
Stata, Roodman (2006). All regressions weighted by list size. Robust standard errors, clustered at hospital level, 
in parentheses. Observations are quarterly and cover the sub-sample of hospitals for which all relevant data are 
available. DepVar_j is the j
th lag of the dependent variable. Size of workforce variable included in the model. AR 
are tests for serial correlation in the residuals of the models. For the FE models these are directly on  ht v . The null 
is that of no serial correlation between  ht v  and  , h t j v - . For the GMM results these are tests for serial correlation in 
the differenced errors,  ht v D . Rejection of AR2 indicates serial correlation in  ht v  in that case. AR tests for fixed 
effects models are based on unweighted estimation results. GMM estimates are first-differenced one-step GMM, 
using instruments dated t-2,...,t-4, collapsed. For admissions, the lagged levels of the target pressure measure 
dated  t-3,…,t-5  are  used  as  instruments.  Hansen  is  a  test  for  instrument  validity.  Dof  is  the  number  of 
overidentifying instruments. Significance levels: * 5% ** 1%. See further details in Appendix B. 
 
 
5.3  Gaming 
 
We first examine whether the increase in planned additions seen in the country level analysis 
appears  to  be  related  to  responses  to  target  pressure.  Table  4  shows  clear  evidence  of 
dynamics, but no evidence that planned additions are associated with target pressure.
17 We 
also examine the impact of the policy on the shorter-term strategies of increasing removals 
and suspensions. Table 5 presents the estimates. The within groups models with no dynamics 
are misspecified but, even in this model, there is an association of removal activity with the 
target  pressure.  The  within  groups  estimators  allowing  for  dynamics  are  significant  and 
                                                 
17 The  results  are  very  similar  using  planned  additions  as  a  proportion  of  all  additions  (available  from  the 
authors).   25 
positive and show no evidence of dynamic misspecification. The preferred GMM estimator 
increases the point estimates for the target pressure variable quite considerably compared to 
the within group estimates. A 1 percentage point increase in the pressure variable increases  
suspensions and removals by about 2 and 2.5 percent respectively. 
 
Table 5. Estimated effect of target pressure on suspensions and removals 
  Suspensions  Removals 






































             
AR1 (p)  0.00  0.37  0.00  0.00  0.48  0.00 
AR2 (p)  0.00  0.77  0.62  0.01  0.25  0.28 
Hansen (p)      0.27      0.45 
Dof      6      5 
N  213  212  187  217  213  189 
NT  3468  3266  3043  3570  3180  2963 
Notes: Dependent variables are log number of suspension and log number of removals from the list. See further 
notes of Table 4. 
 
 
We also examine the issue of re-prioritisation of patients by looking at the proportion of 
urgent cases admitted within 14 days and the proportion of cases with complications as a 
function of target pressure. We found no effect of distance from target on either outcome 
(results available from authors). 
 
These analyses suggest that target pressure did lead managers to admit more patients; it also 
led to some gaming, in terms of increasing the number of suspensions and removals. But they 
suggest that the somewhat puzzling finding of an increase in planned cases in the difference-
in-difference results was not due to the waiting list policy.  
5.4  Magnitudes of the impact of targets 
These estimates can be used to provide an estimate of the impact on behaviour from target 
pressure. The estimates show a one percentage point increase in the pressure measure resulted 
in just under a 1% increase in admissions, a 2% increase in removals and a 2.5% increase in   26 
suspensions. Evaluated at the relevant mean for all hospitals, this equals approximately 40 
extra admissions, 14 more removals and 8 more suspensions per quarter.  
A one percentage point increase in the pressure measure is small compared to the change in 
the measure over time and is also small compared to the gap between those hospitals most at 
risk and those least at  risk (see Figure 2).  After removing the time trend in the pressure 
measure,  the  between  hospital  90:10  percentile  gap  in  the  target  pressure  distribution  is 
approximately 10 percentage points. Using our estimates, a hospital at the 90
th point in the 
distribution of target pressure compared to one at the 10
th point in this distribution would 
admit 400 more patients per quarter. This is a reasonably large number of extra admissions, 
though only about 5% of the 90:10 gap in admissions. For suspensions, a hospital at the 90
th 
point in the target pressure distribution would have 70 more suspensions, which is about 10% 
of the 90:10 gap in suspensions. For removals, a hospital at the 90
th percentile of the target 




These estimates can be compared to those from the country analysis to check that the target 
pressure  measure  is  in  the  same  ball  park  as  the  difference-in-difference  estimates.  The 
difference-in-difference  results  showed  a  increase  in  admissions  between  England  and 
Scotland post policy of around 11% per quarter. Estimated at the mean number of admissions 
per English hospital of 4000 this equates to 440 more admissions per quarter. This is of a 
similar magnitude to the difference in admissions between a hospital in the top and one in the 
bottom decile of the target pressure distribution.  
 
5.5   The effect on patient outcomes 
 
The country level analyses showed that patient outcomes did not deteriorate post policy in 
England. In fact, they improved on two of the three measures. We examine the robustness of 
these findings by estimating the association of mortality with target pressure. It is unlikely 
that target pressure is affected by mortality of patients and therefore we assume the target 
pressure variable is exogenous to mortality. We therefore estimate fixed effects models for a 
range of mortality measures controlling for mortality specific case-mix. Table 6 presents the 
results. None of the coefficients are either large or statistically significantly different from 
                                                 
18 The 90:10 gap in admissions is 7800, in suspensions is 750 and in removals is 1360.   27 
zero. We conclude there is little evidence that quality, as measured by mortality rates, fell as a 
result of targets.  
 
Table 6. Impact of distance from target on patient outcomes (per 10,000)  
Mortality within 28 
days of discharge 
Mortality within 30 days of 
surgery (selected procedures) 





55+  Elective 
Non-
elective  CABG 
Specialty level             
0.19  0.22     -0.14  0.20     General 
surgery  (0.15)  (0.19)     (0.11)  (0.55)    
-0.18  -0.25     -0.02  -0.47     Trauma and 
orthopaedics  (0.15)  (0.20)     (0.05)  (0.38)    
Hospital level        5.68        0.85 
         (4.10)        (1.21) 
Notes: Data from HES 2001/02 to 2005/06, linked to ONS mortality records. Analysis at individual episode 
level. Analyses of ‘in hospital’ and ‘within 28 days of discharge’ mortality use 50% samples of the full dataset. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Regressions contain hospital fixed effects. For specialty level outcomes, 
we control for quarter of admission, age and gender of patient, HRG dummies, nurses as % of staff, doctors as % 
of staff, and log of total admissions. For hospital level outcomes, we control for quarter of admission, age and 
gender of patient, non-elective admission indicator (CABG only), indicator for ‘with complications’ (AMI only), 




6.   Conclusions 
 
This paper provides evidence that, contrary to popular views, a policy of targets for waiting 
lists in the English NHS appears to have achieved its objectives. The length of time patients 
waited fell and admissions for elective care rose. This fall in waiting times was achieved 
without many of the gaming activities that had been forecast. The waiting times distribution 
did not stack up at the maximum waiting point, the order in which patients were treated from 
the list did not appear to change, the proportion of urgent cases treated did not fall and there is 
no evidence of a decrease in several measures of quality of care as a result of the policy. 
 
However, there is also evidence that the policy did lead to waiting list manipulation: the 
number of suspensions and removals increased as a result of the policy. On the measures of 
severity and patient care that we have available, we find no evidence that the severity of   28 
patients who were admitted for treatment changed or that the quality of care of those treated 
in hospital fell. So we conclude that this was probably not gaming, in the sense that it was 
associated with welfare losses, but was either simply better management of lists or occurred 
on too small a scale to affect overall patient outcomes. However, we note that the quality 
measures we use are quite crude and pertain to treated patients. It is possible that there are 
patients who were worse off because of this policy: for example, suspended patients received 
treatment later than they otherwise would have done and removed patients possibly received 
no hospital treatment at all. But our measures do not pick up their possibly poorer outcomes. 
 
Our findings raise the issue of why the policy appears to have met its aim with no evidence of 
negative side effects. One possibility is the one we just mention: our quality measures are too 
broad and hospital based to capture any fall in outcomes. But given the positive outcomes that 
we do find, we suggest three other possible and non-exclusive reasons. First, because long 
waiting lists were seen as a problem by most of society, the targets may have acted as a 
mission for NHS employees, inducing additional effort at no cost. Second, the fact that the 
targets were announced in advance and were escalating may have meant that production was 
reorganised on a long term basis, so increasing productivity over the long term, rather than 
simply resulting in short term fixes to a once-off policy. Finally, the policy was accompanied 
by  extra  resources.  While  we  have  established  that  the  results  are  robust  to  controls  for 
resources,  it  is  probably  easier  to  engage  in  service  reorganisation  in  a  time  of  generous 
resources.   29 
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Appendix A. Data Sources 
Table A1: Data sources for country level outcomes, 1997/98 to 2003/04 
Variable  Notes  Source 
% of list waiting x months or 
more on census date (official) 
·  At end of financial quarter  Department of Health: Provider based waiting times/list statistics. 
i 
ISD Scotland: SMR3 Inpatient/Day case waiting list census. 
ii 
% of list waiting x months or 
more on census date 
(reconstructed) 
·  At end of financial quarter 
·  Uses discharge records up 
to 2005/06 to avoid end-of-
period truncation 
Department of Health: Hospital Episode Statistics (HES) - 10% of elective 
episodes. 




- Waiting duration 
distribution 
- % with complications 
- % "planned" 
- Mean length of stay 
- "Urgent" HRGs 
·  During financial quarter 
·  Planned admissions are 
expressed as a percentage of 
total planned and non-
planned elective admissions 
·  All other measures exclude 
planned admissions 
Department of Health: Hospital Episode Statistics (HES) - 10% of elective 
episodes. 
ISD Scotland: SMR01 General/Acute Inpatient and Day Case - 50% of elective 
episodes. 
Volume of emergency 
admissions 
·  During financial quarter  Department of Health: Hospital Episode Statistics (HES) - all emergency 
episodes. 
ISD Scotland: SMR01 General/Acute Inpatient and Day Case - all emergency 
episodes. 
Volume of list additions  ·  During financial quarter 
·  Uses discharge records up 
to 2005/06 to avoid end-of-
period truncation 
Department of Health: Hospital Episode Statistics (HES) - 10% of elective 
episodes. 
ISD Scotland: SMR01 General/Acute Inpatient and Day Case - 50% of elective 
episodes. 
Age standardised mortality 
ratio 
·  Calendar year 
·  1997/98 and 1998/99 
figures interpolated 
ONS Population Trends 125, Table 2.2. 
iii 
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Health expenditure  ·  During financial year 
·  Figures for 1997/98 and 
1998/99 re-adjusted 
according to PESA 2005 
trend 
PESA 2003 table 8.3a, PESA 2004 8.5a and PESA 2005 tables 8.5a, 8.6a, …, 
8.9a. 
iv 
Workforce whole time 
equivalent 
·  At 30th September  NHS hospital and community health services non-medical staff in England: 1994-
2004 (Table 1A). 
v 
NHSScotland Workforce statistics: Table A1. 
vi 
Population  ·  Mid-year estimates  ONS Population Trends 125, Table 1.2. 
iv 
 
Table A2: Data for provider level outcomes, England only, 2000/01 (q4) to 2004/05 (q3) unless otherwise stated 
Variable  Notes  Source 
Volume of elective admissions  ·  During financial quarter  Department of Health: Provider based elective admission events. 
i 
Volume of emergency 
admissions 
·  During financial quarter 
·  2000/01 (q4) to 2003/04 
(q4) 
Department of Health: Hospital Episode Statistics (HES) - all emergency 
episodes. 
"Planned" additions as a % of 
total list additions 
·  During financial quarter 
·  Uses discharge records up to 
2005/06 to avoid end-of-
period truncation 
Department of Health: Hospital Episode Statistics (HES) - 10% of elective 
episodes. 
List removals  ·  At end of financial quarter  Department of Health: Provider based elective admission events. 
i 
List suspensions  ·  At end of financial quarter  Department of Health: Provider based patients who have deferred admission. 
i 
% of "urgent" HRGs admitted 
within 14 days 
·  During financial quarter  Department of Health: Hospital Episode Statistics (HES) - 10% of elective 
episodes. 
% of elective admissions with 
complications 
·  During financial quarter 
·  Identified via HRG v3.5 title 
Department of Health: Hospital Episode Statistics (HES) - 10% of elective 
episodes.   34 
Mortality in-hospital and after 
discharge 
·  During financial quarter 
·  Defined according to NHS 
mortality rate PI's for 
2002/03 
vii 
HES data linked with ONS death records. 
  
Emergency readmission after 
treatment for a fractured hip 
·  During financial quarter 
·  Defined according to NHS 
re-admission rate PI's for 
2002/03 
viii 
Department of Health: Hospital Episode Statistics (HES). 
"Distance from target": % of 
specialty list at risk of 
breaching target if untreated by 
next census date 
·  At start of quarter (as 
proxied by end of previous 
quarter) 
Department of Health: Provider based waiting times/list statistics. 
i 
Workforce: 
- Whole time equivalent. 
- Doctors and qualified nurses 
as % of total WTE. 
·  At 30th September  Department of Health: Non-medical staff groups by NHS organisation, table 8. 
ix 
Department of Health: HCHS medical and dental staff, table 3.1. 
ix 
List size  ·  At start of quarter (as 
proxied by end of previous 
quarter) 
Department of Health: Provider based waiting times/list statistics. 
i 
 
i   http://www.performance.doh.gov.uk/waitingtimes/index.htm  
ii   Obtained on request from ISD  
iii   http://www.statistics.gov.uk/downloads/theme_population/PT125_main_part3.pdf  
iv   http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/economic_data_and_tools/finance_spending_statistics/pes_publications/pespub_index.cfm  
v   http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics/Publications/PublicationsStatistics/DH_4106723  
vi   http://www.isdscotland.org/isd/workforce-statistics.jsp?pContentID=1347&p_applic=CCC&p_service=Content.show& 
vii   http://www.performance.doh.gov.uk/nhsperformanceindicators/2002/trdca_t.doc 
viii  http://www.performance.doh.gov.uk/performanceratings/2002/s_133.doc  
ix   http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics/Statistics/StatisticalWorkAreas/Statisticalworkforce/DH_4087066   35 
 
 
Table A3: Difference-in-difference estimates of impact of policy on waiting times (days) 

















  (0.20)  (0.28)  (0.80)  (2.52)  (4.13)  (1.02) 
Country = England  -1.25





  (0.28)  (0.40)  (1.13)  (3.56)  (5.84)  (1.44) 
Year = 1998/99  -0.25  -0.75  -2.25  -5.75  -20.25
**  -5.19
** 
  (0.28)  (0.40)  (1.13)  (3.56)  (5.84)  (1.44) 
Year = 1999/00  0.00  0.00  -1.25  -2.75  -4.75  -1.18 
  (0.28)  (0.40)  (1.13)  (3.56)  (5.84)  (1.44) 
Year = 2000/01  0.00  0.25  1.00  4.25  9.00  3.48
* 
  (0.28)  (0.40)  (1.13)  (3.56)  (5.84)  (1.44) 
Year = 2001/02  -1.00
**  -1.25
**  -1.00  3.00  13.25
*  2.84 
  (0.28)  (0.40)  (1.13)  (3.56)  (5.84)  (1.44) 
Year = 2002/03  -1.00
**  -1.00




  (0.28)  (0.40)  (1.13)  (3.56)  (5.84)  (1.44) 





  (0.28)  (0.40)  (1.13)  (3.56)  (5.84)  (1.44) 
1998/99 in England  0.50  1.50
*  2.50  -3.25  -16.75
*  -0.63 
  (0.40)  (0.56)  (1.59)  (5.04)  (8.26)  (2.04) 
1999/00 in England  0.25  0.50  1.25  -9.25  -34.75
**  -6.07
** 
  (0.40)  (0.56)  (1.59)  (5.04)  (8.26)  (2.04) 




  (0.40)  (0.56)  (1.59)  (5.04)  (8.26)  (2.04) 
2001/02 in England  1.75
**  3.00
**  5.00
**  -1.50  -33.50
**  -5.83
** 
  (0.40)  (0.56)  (1.59)  (5.04)  (8.26)  (2.04) 







  (0.40)  (0.56)  (1.59)  (5.04)  (8.26)  (2.04) 
2003/04 in England  1.25
**  1.50




  (0.40)  (0.56)  (1.59)  (5.04)  (8.26)  (2.04) 
Number of obs  56  56  56  56  56  56 
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Appendix B. Panel Data Estimation Procedure 
 
The model as specified in Section 2.2 is given by 
 
, 1 , ht h t ht i h t i h ht i o d z o v a b q g h - - ¢ = + + + + + ∑  
 
and direct estimation by Ordinary Least Squares would lead to biased estimates, due to the 
correlation of the lagged dependent variables  , h t j o -  and the hospital effect  h h . The fixed 
effects, or within groups, estimator is also biased, but this bias decreases with an increasing 
number of time periods. 
The Arellano-Bond (1991) procedure is to transform the model into first-differences to get rid 
of the hospital fixed effects: 
 
, 1 , ht h t ht i h t i ht i o d z o v b q g - - ¢ D = D +D + D +D ∑ , 
 
where  , 1 ht ht h t o o o - D = - .  As  now  , 1 h t o - D   is  clearly  correlated  with  ht v D ,  one  can  use  lags 
, 2 , 2 ,..., h t h t j o o - - -   as  instruments  employing  an  instrumental  variables  estimation  technique, 
provided the idiosyncratic errors  ht v  are not serially correlated. In the model for admissions, 
we find by means of the Hansen test for overidentifying restrictions that there is correlation 
between  , 1 ht ht h t v v v - D = -  and  , 2 h t d - , therefore requiring instruments dated  , 3 , 3 ,..., h t h t j d d - - - . 
No such problem was found for planned admissions, removals and suspensions, and therefore 
, 2 , 2 ,..., h t h t j d d - - -   can  be  used  as  instruments  in  those  cases,  improving  the  strength  of  the 
instruments,  but  still  allowing  for  correlation  between  , 1 h t v -   and  , 1 h t d - .  To  allow  for 
measurement  error  in  the  workforce  variable,  this  variable  is  treated  as  endogenous  and 
instruments dated  , 2 , 2 ,..., h t h t j z z - - -  are used. 